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had argued that the territorial reach in discrimination
cases should be wider than ordinary employment rights.
LJ Burnet rejected this argument in his decision, but did
not rule out the possibility that there may be
circumstances in which the territorial scope might be
wider ‘... where the application of the 2010 Act to the
employment could conflict with local laws and customs.
Should such a case arise, the issue will need consideration.’ 
There may be some merit in the claimants’
proposition. Dismissing an employee because of a
protected characteristic is insidious compared to
dismissing an employee for, say, gross misconduct. The
law already recognises differences between non-
discrimination and general employment rights – for
example, the length of service requirement for unfair
dismissal does not apply to discriminatory dismissals.
There is therefore no reason why a broader approach
should not be adopted in discrimination cases.
Implications for practitioners
Employees of British employers working abroad
The decision provides useful guidance on the approach
to be taken in cases of discrimination against peripatetic
or expatriate workers. It will be easier to establish whether
such a worker can rely on the EA, although it does not
necessarily mean that a worker who is unable to show a
‘sufficient’ connection to the UK will automatically be
precluded from making a discrimination claim.
Practitioners will need to look very closely at not only
the circumstances of the employment but the wider
societal context.    
Public sector equality duty P
The law is clear that the ‘due regard’ duty ‘must be
fulfilled before and at the time when a particular policy
is being formulated.’ (R (Bracking) v Secretary of State for
Work and Pensions [2013] EWCA Civ 1345; [See
Briefing 702]. However, there may be circumstances in
which a court may consider that it would be
inappropriate to quash a decision or policy on the basis
that a public authority did not have ‘due regard’ at the
outset. Much would depend on the implications for
doing so. 
The court has given leave to appeal the decision; the
appeal will be heard in March 2016.
Esther Maynard
Freelance equality and diversity consultant
Briefing 771
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Implications for practitioners
The Northern Ireland High Court has ruled that the
Northern Ireland Executive acted unlawfully by failing
to fulfil its statutory duty to adopt a strategy setting out
its proposals for tackling poverty, social exclusion and
patterns of deprivation based on objective need. The
decision is a rare, if not unique, example of a court
ordering a government department to strategise in an
objectively verifiable manner. It might serve as a useful
precedent for campaigners who in other settings are
seeking to hold public bodies to account for not
developing effective strategies to reduce socio-economic
inequalities.  
Facts
In October 2006, as part of the St Andrews Agreement,
the UK government promised to publish an
Anti-Poverty and Social Exclusion Strategy to tackle
deprivation in all communities of Northern Ireland
based on objective need. The strategy was to have built
on existing initiatives concerning neighbourhood and
community renewal and was then to have been taken
forward by the new Northern Ireland Executive (the
current one was in suspension). To give legal force to
these promises, s28E of the Northern Ireland Act 1998,
inserted by s16 of the Northern Ireland (St Andrews
Agreement) Act 2006, explicitly stated that the
Executive ‘shall adopt a strategy setting out how it proposes
to tackle poverty, social exclusion and patterns of
deprivation based on objective need’.
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771Early in 2007 an 86-page document entitled Lifetime
Opportunities: Government’s Anti-Poverty and Social
Inclusion Strategy for Northern Ireland was published. Its
Foreword was written by the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland, who referred to it as a British
government document, even though the title page says
that it was produced by the Office of the First Minister
and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) in conjunction
with all other Northern Ireland government
departments. The document carried the OFMDFM’s
logo and appeared on its website. At several points it
recognised the need to target policies and programmes
at those in greatest objective need.
The difficulty facing the Committee on the
Administration of Justice (CAJ), the most prominent
human rights and equality NGO in Northern Ireland,
was that it could not work out if the OFMDFM had in
fact been applying an anti-poverty and social inclusion
strategy based on objective need. An OFMDFM official
informed the CAJ that in November 2008 the Executive
had formally adopted ‘the broad architecture and
principles of Lifetime Opportunities as the basis of its
strategy’, but in response to a Freedom of Information
Act request the department admitted that it held no
information regarding the definition of objective need. 
High Court
In trying to discern whether OFMDFM had fulfilled its
obligation to produce a strategy based on objective need,
Treacy J based himself on the Oxford English
Dictionary’s definition of ‘strategy’, which sees it as ‘a
plan of action designed to achieve a long-term or overall
aim’. While he acknowledged that the Executive had
formally adopted ‘the architecture and principles’ of
Lifetime Opportunities, and had later adopted other
‘initiatives / policies / interventions / frameworks’, the judge
concluded that the Executive’s so-called strategy was
‘inchoate’, a word which most dictionaries define as ‘just
beginning’, ‘not yet fully developed’ or ‘rudimentary’.
What the judge said he had been looking for was a
‘road map’, a ‘guide, to set a course’, something capable of
‘providing policy level guidance to the stakeholders charged
with achieving its goals’. He added:
that strategy must be identifiable, it must be complete,
it must have a start, a middle and an end, it must aim
to be effective, its effectiveness must be capable of
measurement and the actions which are taken in
attempting to implement that strategy must be referable
back to that overarching strategy.
Comment
The case represents a remarkable victory for the CAJ and
arguably takes the law further than it has already
reached. In the English High Court case of R (Child
Poverty Action Group) v Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions [2012] EWHC 2579 (Admin) Singh J ruled
that the Secretary of State had acted unlawfully in
preparing a national poverty strategy without first
complying with the statutory duty, imposed by s10(1)
of the Child Poverty Act 2010, to request the advice of
the Child Poverty Commission. No such advice had
been sought because no such Commission had been
created, despite s8 of the 2010 Act asserting ‘[t]here is to
be a body called the Child Poverty Commission’ and
making further provision for it elsewhere in the Act.
The CAJ relied on this precedent when arguing its
case in the Northern Ireland High Court. But in the
CPAG case the government’s failure did not lie in
neglecting to produce a strategy but in neglecting to
consult properly before doing so. In persuading the
judge that in its case there was no strategy in the first
place, the CAJ probably achieved more than it set out
to do. Despite the considerable documentation which
the OFMDFM produced to show that it had thought
about and acted upon plans for reducing poverty and
promoting social inclusion, the CAJ persuaded the judge
to demand more from the department. So unconvinced
was he that a strategy existed at all that he relegated to
obiter dicta his views that whatever plans did currently
exist could not be said to be based on objective need.
The decision does not so much take the law on
judicial review of policy-making any further as provide
an excellent example of the power of the existing law 
to embarrass a government and force it to keep its
policy-making promises. The Northern Ireland Executive
is not appealing the decision, so we await with interest
the strategy document which will now have to emerge
and the criteria for objective need which will have to lie
at its base.
Brice Dickson 
School of Law, Queen’s University Belfast
b.dickson@qub.ac.uk
